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ARTICLE 4: BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
F. GALAND RUSSELL, JR.*
Bank advertisements frequently inform the public of the advantages
of a checking account. Paying by check is more convenient than making
the rounds to distribute cash among one s creditors, it is safer than sending
currency through the mails, and the cancelled checks provide the drawer
with a convincing proof of payment. When a person opens a checking ac-
count, he expects his bank to pay the checks he writes which have been
properly indorsed by the recipients, to sift out and reject checks on his
account which have been forged or materially altered, and to cash the
checks which he receives from others by paying him currency or by con-
verting these checks into credit in his own bank account. These expecta-
tions outline the subject matter treated in Article 4 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
While checks account for the bulk of instruments which are collected
through the banking system, the rules established by Article 4 must be
sufficiently broad to cover the great variety of both negotiable and non-
negotiable documents' which are continuously handled, and sufficiently
.flexible to apply to new types of financial paper which may gain currency
during the half century or more the Uniform Commercial Code is ex-
pected to be in effect. These rules must be drafted to provide guidance for
large banks where check clearing and posting operations are handled by
high speed electronic equipment and for small banks where these tasks may
still be performed manually. Aside from necessary definitions and prelimi-
nary matters covered in Part 1 and the specialized rules on the collection
of documentary drafts in Part 5 (which in the present paper must fall
victim to the limitations of space), Article 4 is devoted to the interrelated
problems of (1) how instruments for the payment of money are collected
through the banking system, (2) when a payor bank becomes accountable
for the amount of an instrument to the party making presentment, and (3)
what rights the payor bank has to reimburse itself through charging the
account of its depositor for amounts which it has paid. Due to space
*Assistant Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
1. Such instruments include maturing notes, acceptances, bankers' accept-
ances, certificates of deposits, bills of exchange, drafts with documents attached,
maturing bonds and coupons, state and municipal warrants and special or general
obligations of states and their political subdivisions; 12 C.F.R. § 207.1 (1963).
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limitations, this paper will only review the law as it applies to checks in
the light of the recently enacted Uniform Commercial Code, at the expense
of slighting rules designed specifically for handling other types of commercial
paper.2
The exposition contained in Article 4 for the solution of problems con-
cerning the collection and payment by banks of financial paper is neither
exclusive nor revolutionary. Many of a bank's responsibilities with regard
to a negotiable instrument arise from the nature of the instrument and
not from the circumstance that one party happens to be a bank. The duty
to protest a dishonored foreign instrument and send prompt notice of dis-
honor in order to hold parties secondarily liable arises under the law of
negotiable instruments (Article 3 of the Code) and applies with equal force
to any party making presentment. Questions concerning the transfer of
bonds may require resort to the law of investment securities, Article 8.1
The province of Article 4 is to provide rules to deal with those aspects of
the collection and payment which are particularly relevant to the banking
system.
The draftsmen of the bank collections and deposits rules in Article 4
did not write on a clean slate. The bank collection system, as it has evolved
through usage and the principles of contracts, agency, and trusts, is capable
of handling checks in astronomical numbers in a routine which operates
smoothly. New rules which would disturb established practices would likely
bring practical chaos far in excess of their theoretical or demonstrable ad-
vantages. Thus the authors of Article 4 directed their energies toward
providing a more satisfactory framework in which to conduct the collec-
tion process. They sought a framework which would remove variations in
the rules of different states for handling what is essentially a multistate
operation and which could be adapted to the needs of changing business
conditions.'
2. Perhaps the most significant provision which has no application to checks
is § 400.4-210, RSMo 1963 Supp., which allows a bank to make presentment to
non-bank payors by written notice. This section recognizes what has become an
accepted, if legally questionable practice. Batchelder v. Granite Trust Co., 339
Mass. 224, 157 N.E.2d 540 (1959).
3. In the event of conflict, the provisions of Article 4 take precedence over
those of Article 3 but not over those of Article 8. 400.4-102(1), RSMo 1963Supp.4. 'With items flowing in great volume not only in and around metropolitan
and smaller centers but also continuously across state lines and back and forth
across the entire country, a proper situation exists for uniform rules that will
state in modern concepts at least some of the rights of the parties and in addi-
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In states where bank collections have been governed primarily by
case law, Article 4 may make some important changes. However, in Mis-
souri provisions of Article 4 parallel the Bank Collection Code, adopted in
1929, which will be superseded by the Uniform Commercial Code on July
1, 1965. 5 In considering the provisions of Article 4 just before it became
effective in Massachusetts, one court said that reference to the new law
was appropriate because the Uniform Commercial Code was regarded "less
as a novel enactment than as largely a restatement and clarification of exist-
ing law which has the approval of American scholars."" The impact of
Article 4 on Missouri law could be similarly described.
I. BANKS AND THE COLLECTION OF CHECKS
The presentment of a check or other financial instrument to the
designated payee is a matter of varying complexity depending upon the
facts of each case. When a buyer of goods gives a check to a seller who
lives in the same locality and carries his account at the same bank, pre-
sentment for payment can be quickly accomplished by the payee himself.
Where the buyer and seller have different banks in the same city, present-
ment may be made by the seller's bank acting through the local clearing
house. But where the buyer and seller are located on opposite sides of the
country or where a promissory note is payable at a distance from the
holder's residence, the intervention of additional parties to move the in-
strument to the place of payment, make a proper presentment, and return
the proceeds to the owner becomes necessary. If a substantial distance is
An example of the need for uniformity can be seen in the career of a raised
check which is handled by collecting banks in several states. Under §§ 400.4-
207(1) (c) and 400.4-207(2) (c), RSMo 1963 Supp., each collecting bank war-
rants to the payor bank and each subsequent collecting bank that the check has
not been materially altered. This warranty is not made by a collecting bank in a
state having the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and is probably not covered
by the guaranty of prior indorsements, 8 ZOLLMANN, BANKS AND BANKING § 5635
(1936). Contra, New York Produce Exch. Bank v. Twelfth Ward Bank, 135 App.
Div. 52, 119 N.Y.S. 988 (1909). Consequently, a collecting bank in a Code state
may find itself making warranties to subsequent parties, &et receiving no analogous
warranties from its transferor in a non-Code state. See 12 C.F.R. § 210.5(5)(1963).
5. The Uniform Commercial Code specifically repeals Chapter 402, RSMo
1959, entitled "Bank Collection Code," as well as Chapter 401, RSMo 1959, en-
titled "Negotiable Instruments," which contains provisions applicable to banks
and their depositors; Mo. Laws 1963, at 637, § 10-102. Some provisions concerning
bank-customer relations, e.g., §§ 362.365, 363.300, RSMo 1959, on stop payment
orders, and §§ 362.370, 363.610, RSMo 1959, on payment of stale checks, are left
to the implicit repeal of all inconsistent legislation in Mo. Laws 1963, at 638,
§ 10-103.
6. Universal CIT Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 161 F. Supp.
790, 792 (D. Mass. 1958).
19641
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involved, the collection process is likely to include not only the bank of
deposit and the bank to make payment, but a number of intermediary
banks, either Federal Reserve Banks or large commercial banks, which
regularly exchange bundles of checks referred to as "cash letters" with
each other and with the depositary or payor bank. Much of the acceptabil-
ity of financial paper depends upon the existence of an organized system
which can accomplish collection for the holder at a price which will not
vary appreciably with the distances or number of intermediate parties in-
volved and which will not materially reduce the value of his instrument.
To meet this need a bank collection system must be able to handle many
more than 25,000,000 checks daily at a low per item cost.7
A. Collecting Banks-From Agency to Statute
In the vast majority of cases the check collection operation completes
its task without incident or cause for second thoughts on the part of the
depositor. The aberrational instances where the courts have been called
upon to examine the theory of bank collections have generally arisen where
the check has disappeared in the course of collection or where the col-
lecting process fails to make the contemplated remittance to a depositor
because of the insolvency of one or more of the banks. The ultimate de-
termination as to whether the bank of deposit or its depositor must bear
the loss, under Missouri case law, turned on whether the bank took the
particular check as an agent of the holder for the purpose of making col-
lection or whether the bank purchased it from its depositor and had itself
become the owner. 8
If the check was accepted by the bank as the depositor's agent, it
might revoke or recover any credit it had allowed the depositor9 and leave
him, as owner, to pursue his claim against any intermediary bank whose
7. A high degree of uniformity in the material handled is a characteristic
of today's check collection process which has made electronic processing possible.
Whatever functions drafts may have served in the past to provide a type of sup-
plementary money for the merchant community which could pass from one
holder to another in satisfaction of obligations, today's check is normally an in-
strument drawn on standard bank-supplied forms for the purpose of transferring
credits from the account of one bank depositor to that of another.
8. Under the code when a check is dishonored upon presentment, the con-
sequences for the depositor and the bank of deposit are much the same regardless
of whether the bank is treated as agent of the depositor or as owner of the check.
If the dishonor is not attributable to negligence by the bank, e.g., undue delay in
making presentment, the bank can recover from the depositor either as an agent
entitled to reimbursement from its principal or on the warranties given on trans-
fer of the item, § 400.3-414(1), RSMo 1963 Supp. If the bank's negligence was
the cause of the dishonor, it cannot recover from the depositor under either theory.
9. Pollack v. National Bank of Commerce, 168 Mo. App. 368, 151 S.W. 774
(St. L. Ct. App. 1912) (credit given is presumed to be provisional).
[Vol. 29
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negligence caused the collection attempt to miscarry or to seek the pro-
ceeds among the remaining assets of the payor or intermediary collecting
bank which had gone insolvent.10 The capacity in which a bank received
an item was a matter to be settled by examining the intention of the
parties." Customarily indorsements, bank collection agreements, deposit
10. In the event of the depositary bank's insolvency, the customary roles
may be reversed and the depositor may seek to maintain the bank's agency. In
Thomson v. Bank of Syracuse, 220 Mo. App. 805, 278 S.W. 810 (K.C. Ct. App.
1926), the depositor wished to establish the agency of the insolvent depositary
bank in order to claim the proceeds of the'collection as the beneficiary of a trust
rather than being limited to a claim as a general depositor of the bank. See also,
Farmers' Exch. Bank v. Farm & Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 332 Mo. 1041, 61
S.W.2d 717 (1933) (payment stopped at request of payee-depositor of failed
bank); May v. Bank of Hughesville, 291 S.W. 170 (K.C. Mo. App. 1927).
The rights of an owner of the proceeds of a paid item to a preferred claim on
the assets of an insolvent bank which was holding the proceeds at the time of
insolvency are treated in § 400.4-214, RSMo 1963 Supp. Briefly, they are:
(1) If a collecting or payor bank suspends payments, the unpaid checks
in its possession should be returned to the presenting bank or to the
closed bank's customer;
(2) If the payor bank fails after having finally paid a check but without
having made a settlement which is or becomes final, the owner of
the check (now the proceeds) has a preferred claim against the payor
bank;
(3) If a collecting bank fails after it has received a final settlement for
an item but before it has made a final settlement with its transferor,
the owner has a preferred claim against the assets of the collecting
bank.
These rules parallel those under the Bank Collection Code, § 402.110, RSMo
1959, and the position developed in Missouri decisions: Federal Reserve Bank v.
Millspaugh, 314 Mo. 1, 282 S.W. 706 (1926) (failed payor bank); Bank of
Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh, 313 Mo. 412, 281 S.W. 733 (1926); Schreier v. Joplin
State Bank, 63 S.W.2d 179 (Spr. Mo. App. 1933); Aurora Farmers' Exch. v.
Bank of Aurora, 227 Mo. App. 1030, 62 S.W.2d 562 (Spr. Ct. App. 1933) (failed
depositary bank); Federal Reserve Bank v. Quigley, 284 S.W. 164 (K.C. Mo. App.
1926).
Without, amendment to the National Bank Act's provisions concerning
distribution of assets on liquidation, 13 Stat. 114, 12 U.S.C. § 194, the preference
provisions of § 400.4-214, RSMo 1963 Supp., cannot apply to national banks:
Jennings v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 294 U.S. 216 (1935).
In Illinois, the Bank Collection Code was held unconstitutional on the grounds
that the legislature had exceeded its powers in attempting to pass insolvency rules
which would be applicable to national banks and that the insolvency provisions
were inseparable from the remainder of the statute, People ex Tel. Barrett v. Union
Bank & Trust Co., 362 Ill. 164, 199 N.E. 272 (1935). These infirmities could
scarcely apply to the Uniform Commercial Code since the draftsmen are explicit
in confining their efforts to state chartered banks. Comment 3 to UCC § 4-214
(1962).
In Missouri, the constitutionality of the preference provisions of the Bank
Collection Code was upheld against a claim that an unreasonable classification was
involved: Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. West St. Louis Trust Co., 232 Mo. App.
281, 103 S.W.2d 529 (St. L. Ct. App. 1937). A similar result was reached in Illi-
nois, People ex rel. Nelson v. Dennhardt, 354 Ill. 450, 188 N.E. 464 (1933).
11. National City Bank v. Macon Creamery Co., 329 Mo. 639, 46 S.W.2d
127 (1932); Robinson v. Gentry, 106 S.W.2d 913 (St. L. Mo. App. 1937);
Townsend Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Chamberlain Canning Co., 277 S.W. 958 (K.C.
BANK COLLECTIONS1964]
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slips and general banking customs spelled out the bank's agency, 2 but con-
flicting actions, such as permitting the depositor to withdraw credit given
for the deposited instrument, or even giving him credit subject to the right
of withdrawal, were taken as showing that ownership had been transferred.1 8
The Bank Collection Code continued to make the question of whether a
bank was an agent or owner paramount in the determination of rights and
liabilities, but defined many of the terms of the agency and established a
strong presumption of the bank's agency which would require a particular
factual situation to be judged differently than before.' 4
Under section 400.4-201 the rule that a bank accepts an instrument
as the collection agent of the owner is retained largely from a desire to
provide guidance for disputes in areas not covered by specific rules.', But
Mo. App. 1925); Citizens' State Bank v. Ferson, 208 S.W. 136 (K.C. Mo. App.
1919); Mudd v. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank, 175 Mo. App. '398, 162 S.W. 314(K.C. Ct. App. 1914); Midland Nat'l Bank v. Roll, 60 Mo. App. 585 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1895).
12. First Nat'l Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 6 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1925);
Bank of Aurora v. Fruit Growers' Union, 52 S.W.2d 574 (Spr. Mo. App. 1932);
Commerce Trust & Say. Bank v. Schuler, 27 S.W.2d 492 (St. L. Mo. App. 1930);
Midwest Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Parker Corn Co., 211 Mo. App. 413, 245 S.W.
217 (K.C. Ct. App. 1922); Brigance v. Bank of Cooter, 200 S.W. 668 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1918). Contra, Nomland v. First Natl Bank, 64 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1933).
13. Foristel v. Security Nat'l Bank Say. & Trust Co., 320 Mo. 436, 7 S.W.2d
997 (1928); Jefferson Bank v. Merchants' Refrigerating Co., 236 Mo. 407, 139
S.W. 545 (1911); Ayres v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 79 Mo. 421 (1883);
Mississippi Cottonseed Prod. Co. v. First Natl Bank, 142 S.W.2d 1106 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1940); Bank of Buchanan County v. Gordon, 250 S.W. 648 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1923); Charles Renfrow Comm. Co. v. W. B. Northrup Co., 222 S.W. 487(Spr. Mo. App. 1920); Hendley v. Globe Refinery Co., 106 Mo. App. 20, 79 S.W.
1163 (K.C. Ct. App. 1904).
14. § 402.030, RSMo 1959. "We cannot agree that the adoption of the Bank
Collection Code has not changed the rule of law previously existing in this state
as to the passing of title to the bank of deposited checks when credit is at once
given to the depositor with the right to check against such credit. This statute
establishes the relationship of agency in such case and makes the credit so given
a revocable one, except as to such part of the credit as has actually been with-
drawn. Title to the check and its proceeds does not at once pass to the bank in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary. It is conceded here that there is no
agreement to the contrary, that is, no agreement of sale of the check to the bank
other than what is termed an implied agreement from the facts. Such implied
agreement, it is argued, arises from the fact that the check was indorsed in blank,
deposited in the bank, and credit for the same given at once, with the unrestricted
right to check against such credit. To hold that there is such an implied agreement
of sale from these facts is in the teeth of the statute. . . .. Farmers Exch. Bank
v. Farm & Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, supra note 10 at 723, reversing 52 S.W.2d
608 (Spr. Mo. App. 1932); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., 204 F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 1953); Robertson v. Central Manufacturers' Mutual
Ins. Co., 239 Mo. App. 1169, 207 S.W.2d 59 (Spr. Ct. App. 1947).
15. Official comment 2 to VA.M.S. § 400.4-201. First Trust & Say. Bank v.
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 214 F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 856 (1954). This does not prevent a bank from becoming the owner of an
item if the fact can be clearly established, e.g., where a check is given to a bank
[Vol. 29
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the rule is shorn of importance for most questions arising out of bank col-
lections by the provision that "when an item is handled by banks for the
purposes of presentment, payment and collection, the relevant provisions
of this Article apply even though action of parties clearly establish that
a particular bank has purchased the item and is the owner of it.1116 With
the development of mass handling the terms of an agreed agency have
become more conjectural'7 and have a decreasing connection with anything
the owner is apt to have had in mind when he deposited his check. Courts
have been more inclined to supply the facile answer that he intended his
check to be handled according to standard bank collection practice, what-
ever that might be. Under Article 4 the rights and obligations of collection
banks will arise primarily from their participation in the collection process
without need to seek support in the express or implied agreements between
the bank and the depositor. Article 4 completes the transition of the bank
collection process from a matter of contract to a matter of statutory obliga-
tions which the parties are, by and large, free to vary by agreement if they
choose.
B. The Bank's Duty of Ordinary Care
The basic obligation which a bank undertaking collection assumes is
to exercise ordinary care in its own actions and in the selection of com-
petent intermediate collecting banks when the circumstances indicate. It
does not assume responsibility for the action of the intermediate collection
banks which it selects38 Failure of any bank to fulfill the duty of ordinary
in payment of a debt owed to the bank. The 1952 Official Draft omitted all
reference to agency from UCC § 4-201. In the 1958 and 1962 drafts, no reference
to agency occurs outside of UCC § 4-201 (1962).
16. § 400.4-201, RSMo 1963 Supp.
17. Note the conceptual difficulties in § 402.050, RSMo 1959, which, after
agency is generally established in § 402.030, RSMo 1959, provides that where there
is a blank indorsement or a bearer item subsequent parties may rely on the
presumption of the bank's ownership. See Comment 6 to UCC § 4-201 (1962).
18. § 400.4-202, RSMo 1963 Supp. At common law there has been a split of
authority between the "Massachusetts rule" which held that the depositary bank
was only liable for the careful selection of correspondent banks and the "New
York rule" which made the depositary bank responsible for the negligence of
subsequent collection banks. City of Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank, 271 U.S.
489 (1926); Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U.S. 160 (1924); First Nat'l
Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, supra note 12.
Missouri decisions followed the Massachusetts rule: Daly v. Butchers' &
Drovers' Bank, 56 Mo. 94 (1874); Hoffman v. Mechanics-American Nat'l Bank,
211 Mo. App. 643, 249 S.W. 168 (St. L. Ct. App. 1923); Landa v. Traders' Bank,
118 Mo. App. 356, 94 S.W. 770 (K.C. Ct. App. 1906) (this rule could be varied
by contract and a bank which received compensation for making the collection
was liable for the default of its correspondent despite a contrary agreement in
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care will render it liable to the owner for damages. But carelessness will not
bring down upon the bank the additional sanction of destroying its right
to charge the item back to the depositor or to the prior collecting bank and
to reverse any provisional credit which it has allowed. 9
The determination of what constitutes ordinary care in discharging
a bank collection obligation involves consideration of three elements: the
actions taken, the manner in which they are performed and the time re-
quired to do them. Negligence may be found when a bank performs in a
slovenly manner, when the course of action it chooses is unreasonable or
when it is unduly slow in performing acts which otherwise would be un-
objectionable.
The requirement that a bank use ordinary care in performing what
it undertakes is not a technical requirement. The bank's employees must
use a degree of skill and attention which may normally be expected of one
performing these tasks. More is required than the conscientious bumbler
who might meet the subjective test of good faith but would scarcely meet
any objective standard of ordinary care.20 "Ordinary care" is expressly
required of a collecting bank in: (a) presenting an item or sending it for
presentment, (b) sending notice of dishonor or non-payment or returning
an item other than a documentary draft after learning that it has not been
paid or accepted, (c) settling for an item when it has received a final
settlement, (d) making any necessary protest, and (e) giving notice of
loss or delay within a reasonable time after it learns the facts.2 1
By contrast, cases concerning preferences on insolvency often treat the in-
solvent payor bank to which an item was forwarded for collection as the agent of
the presenting bank. Federal Reserve Bank v. Millspaugh, supra note 10.
19. § 400.4-212(4)(b), RSMo 1963 Supp. The measure of damages is stated
in § 400.4-103(5), RSMo 1963 Supp., to be "the amount of the item reduced by
an amount which could not have been realized by the use of ordinary care, and
where there is bad faith . . . other damages, if any, suffered by the party as a
proximate consequence." Compare Midwest Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. Parker
Corn Co., supra note 12 (depositor must show that the draft was collectable and
that the bank was negligent in not collecting it and that the actual loss resulted
from this negligence); Selz v. Collins, 55 Mo. App. 55 (St. L. Ct. App. 1893) (in
order to recover the face value on an instrument, the plaintiff must show that the
entire loss was caused by bank's negligence).
20. See Ivory v. Bank of the State of Missouri, 36 Mo. 475 (1865) (un-
familiarity with the collection of a particular type of instrument would not re-
lieve a bank from the duty to exercise proper diligence).
21. § 400.4-202, RSMo 1963 Supp. This listing is probably not intended to be
exhaustive of the cases in which a collecting bank owes a duty of ordinary care.
Note that a bank also owes a duty of good faith in all actions understaken;
§ 400.1-203, RSMo 1963 Supp. See Gerhardt v. Boatman's Say. Inst., 38 Mo. 60
(1866) (when banking usage directed that a dishonored item be turned over to a
notary for protest, a bank would normally have fulfilled its duty by so acting);
Silverforb v. Bank of Nashua, 233 Mo. App. 1239, 128 S.W.2d 1070 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1939) (a bank must give prompt notice of nonpayment).
8
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These responsibilities have been conceived in terms of duties which
the collecting bank owes to the owner of the instrument or to prior col-
lecting banks. However, with the development and increasing use of elec-
tronic processing equipment the duties owed by the collecting bank to sub-
sequent banks are apt to become equally significant.
High speed check processing equipment, both for sorting checks and
for posting them to the drawers' accounts in the payor bank, operates by
means of characters having a passing resemblance to arabic numerals which
are inscribed on the check in magnetic ink. These characters allow the equip-
ment to "read" the amount of the check and the routing symbol identifying
the payor bank. Routing symbols are preprinted on the check forms when
they are prepared by the payor bank's stationer but the amount of each
check must be inscribed after the check has been deposited for collection.
Ideally this is done by the first bank in the collection chain which possesses
high speed equipment.
Possibilities for mistakes exist either in the preprinted encoding of the
bank's routing symbol or in encoding the amount. In the former case, a
subsequent bank to which the check has been forwarded is likely to discover
the error when its machine is unable to find any bank fitting the magnetic
description of the destination to which the check is to be sent. If the sub-
sequent collecting bank follows a practice of returning misrouted items to
the bank from which they were received in the same cash letter with checks
being sent for collection, the entire shipment is apt to be fed back into the
processing equipment of the first bank with the result that the misdirection
will be repeated. With unflagging application of established routine on the
part of the second bank the journeys back and forth can be repeated until
the check disintegrates or becomes so dilapidated from repeated handling
and the stamping of indorsements that it will no longer pass through the
electronic equipment. The possibilities of loss are apparent. The question
to be resolved is what duties does a bank owe to the depositary bank or
other prior collecting banks to return misrouted items in a manner which is
calculated to appraise the prior bank of the error.22
Again, difficulties may arise through mistakes in electronic encoding
of the amount of the check. An error in this procedure is likely to ride
22. A bank to which an item has been erroneously sent would appear to be
within the definition of a collection bank, i.e., "any bank handling the item for
collection except the payor bank." § 400.4-105(d), RSMo 1963 Supp.
Loss through misrouting may be incurred by the depositary bank if, because
of the length of time which has passed with no adverse report on a check, it as-
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through undetected until the drawer of the check complains if his account
has been overcharged (if his account is undercharged it is less likely that
the error will come to light). Errors in encoding of the amount will often
result in no more serious consequences than embarrassment and loss of
time required to straighten out the records, since in most instances an
overpayment will come to rest with the bank that made the mistake; a
difference between an underpayment and the actual amount of the check
could be recovered by the payor bank from a solvent drawer. However, a
compensating error in the encoding of a deposit slip may have caused the
overpayment to reach the depositor's account where it may have been with-
drawn, or the drawer whose account has been undercharged may no longer
be solvent. In such a case, does the encoding bank also owe a duty to the
payor bank, or to the drawer, to exercise ordinary care in encoding the
amount?23 These problems not only indicate the areas where development
through inter-bank agreements may be expected, but point up the fact that
the problems of mechanized bank collections involve dimensions for which
continued elaboration of the principles of agency would scarcely be pro-
ductive.
The time within which a bank exercising ordinary care must take action
is stated as follows: "A collecting bank taking proper action before its mid-
night deadline following receipt of an item, notice or payment acts season-
ably; taking proper action within a reasonably longer time may be season-
able but the bank has the burden of so establishing. 24 Thus, a time limit
23. What is ordinary care in these circumstances may prove a difficult
question. Ordinary care may appear differently depending upon whether the mis-
coded check is viewed individually or as one item in a great volume of work
handled by an operator. Considered individually, encoding a wrong figure can
scarcely be reconciled with ordinary care, but considered in context, it must be
recognized that a small percentage of mistakes will be made. Otherwise, the
duty to exercise ordinary care would be transformed into a requirement that the
bank guarantee the results except in cases of mechanical failures.
Ordinary care may require that a bank take such steps as employing trained
personnel, "penny balancing" of checks received and dispatched in order to catch
uncompensated errors and separate encoding of checks deposited and deposit slips
in order to minimize the chance that the same error will be repeated.
Section 400.4-204, RSMo 1963 Supp., dealing with forwarding and presenting
items provides: "A collecting bank must send items by reasonably prompt meth-
ods taking into consideration ... the number of such items on hand, and the cost
of collection involved. .. ." Similar qualifications are probably implied in the
duty to exercise ordinary care. Cf. 8 ZOLLMANN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 301:
"The fact that a bank does a large business cannot relieve it from the duty of
giving due attention to every piece of paper it undertakes to collect."
24. § 400.4-202(2), RSMo 1963 Supp. The circumstances which would justify
a bank in taking a longer time to act are indicated in § 400.4-108(2), RSMo 1963
Supp.: "Delay by a collecting bank or payor bank beyond time limits prescribed
or permitted by this chapter or by instructions is excused if caused by interruption
10
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is established allowing flexibility in the event of unforeseen circumstances.
The term "midnight deadline" is a technical term defined as midnight of
the next banking day following receipt of an item or notice that gives rise
to the need for taking action.2 In view of the definition of a "banking day"
as a day on which a bank is open to the public for carrying on "substantially
all" of its banking functions,20 and the authorization for a bank to establish
a "cut-off" hour of two p.m. or later: 2T If an item is received on a Friday
afternoon after the cut-off hour, the item will be considered as not received
until Monday morning and the midnight deadline will not occur until Tues-
day midnight.28
Much of the litigation involving collection banks has considered
whether a particular course of action followed by the bank was consistent
with ordinary care. Appellate judges, giving the matter unhurried consid-
eration have sometimes arrived at conclusions different from those de-
veloped in the day-to-day conduct of bank operations. Probably the most
noted of these disagreements was the decision that the bank was negligent
if it sent items to the payor bank. 9 It was held unreasonable to believe that
a payor bank could serve three masters, acting as the collecting agent of
the forwarding bank, the paying agent of the drawer, and yet protecting
possible claims of its own against the drawer's account. This rule was re-
versed in the Bank Collection Code3" and permission to send checks directly
of communication facilities, suspension of payments by another bank, war, emer-
gency conditions or other circumstances beyond the control of the bank provided
it exercises such diligence as the circumstances require."
Under the Bank Collection Code no similar provision existed for delay be-
yond the specified time, § 402.070, RSMo 1959. However, that section did not
exclude the possibility as it did not purport to be an exhaustive statement of what
constitutes ordinary care.
Failures to act seasonably may render a collecting bank liable for damages but
does not make it accountable for the amount of the check as occurs under § 400.4-
302, RSMo 1963 Supp., when a payor bank delays.
25. § 400.104(1) (h), RSMo 1963 Supp.
26. § 400.104(1) (c), RSMo 1963 Supp.
27. § 400.107(1), RSMo 1963 Supp. The Bank Collection Code, § 402.040(2),
RSMo 1959, allows items received after the close of regular business hours to be
treated as though received at the opening of business on the next business day.
28. Further delay may be permitted in the case of a collecting bank (but
not a payor bank) which decides to allow an additional banking day in a good
faith effort to obtain payment of a specific item. § 400.108(1), RSMo 1963 Supp.
29. Maronde v. Vellenweider, 220 Mo. App. 67, 279 S.W. 774 (Spr. Ct. App.
1926); American Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 71 Mo. App. 451
(K.C. Ct. App. 1897).
30. § 402.070, RSMo 1959. Use of the mails was specifically authorized only
when forwarding to banks in a different town or city. Section 400.4-204, RSMo
1963 Supp., will authorize use of motor carriers or air express between cities and
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to the payor bank continues under section 400.4-204. Permission is also
now given to send an item directly to a payor other than a bank where
authorized by the bank's transferor. Any item other than a documentary
draft may be sent to a non-bank payor when authorized by Federal Reserve
regulations or operating letters, clearinghouse rules or the like.al
Addressing itself generally to the question of what procedures are con-
sistent with the exercise of ordinary care, section 400.4-103(3), (4) pro-
vides:
Action or non-action approved by this Article or pursuant
to Federal Reserve regulations or operating letters constitutes the
exercise of ordinary care, and in the absence of special instructions,
action or non-action consistent with clearing house rules and the
like or a general banking usage not disapproved by this Article,
prima facie constitutes the exercise of ordinary care.
. . . The specification or approval of certain procedures by
this Article does not constitute disapproval of other procedures
which may be reasonable under the circumstances.3 2
C. TI e Collecting Bank's Security Interest
While banks usually have been at pains to maintain the position of
an agent receiving the checks of its depositor for collection, it is a common
practice to allow the depositor credit, normally revocable, for the item
which he deposits. Often the depositor is allowed to draw against this credit.
When subsequent events reveal that the bank will not receive final settle-
ment for the check, and, in addition, the disappearance or insolvency of the
depositor makes "charge-back" to his account impossible, the bank is forced
to seek reimbursement from the maker or from prior indorsers of the in-
strument. They, in turn, maintain that the bank, as agent for collection
rather than owner, has no standing to enforce the engagements which they
have given to the missing principal. In dealing with this argument courts
have strained to find circumstances which might be construed as a transfer
of ownership. The Bank Collection Code provided that, to the extent any
31. Query whether Federal Reserve operating letters or clearinghouse rules
could authorize the direct sending of documentary drafts to non-bank payors. §
400.4-103, RSMo 1963 Supp., on variation through agreements seems broad
enough to suggest that they can.
32. § 400.4-103, RSMo 1963 Supp. See § 402.070(1), RSMo 1959; Massey-
Harris Harvester Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 340 Mo. 1133, 104 S.W.2d 385(1937); cf. Farm & Home Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Stubbs, 231 Mo. App. 87, 112,
98 S.W.2d 320, 337 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936). ("The rules of a clearing house, as
such, do not govern the rights of a drawer or a payee of a check who are not
members of a clearing house.")
[Vol. 29
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revocable credit had been withdrawn, the bank would have the rights of an
owner against prior and subsequent parties.33
The provisions of Article 4 reach similar conclusions within an altered
theoretical framework. Though credit may have been given for an item
which has been drawn against, the bank continues to be classified as an
agent of the depositor." However, a bank is given a security interest in any
item, accompanying documents or proceeds to the extent that it has made
an advance against that item or given credit which has actually been with-
drawn or is available for withdrawal as of right.35 Giving credit or an ad-
vance in the manner which will create a security interest constitutes giving
value so that if the bank can meet the other requirements it can achieve
the status of a holder in due course.38 A security interest may arise not
only in favor of a depositary bank which has given credit to its customer,
but also in favor of a collecting bank which has given credit to a prior
collecting bank or possesses a valid right of set-off.37 This may prove a mat-
ter of more than passing interest because schedules for the availability of
credits often allow a bank to draw against its account with its correspondent
33. § 402.030, RSMo 1959.
34. § 400.4-201, RSMo 1963 Supp.
35. § 400.4-208, RSMo 1963 Supp. When credit is given against a group of
items received together and subject to one agreement, e.g., in the same deposit or
cash letter, the security interest attaches to all items and documents or their
proceeds. In matching credits withdrawn or allowed as a matter of right against
items so as to determine which items are covered by a bank's security interest,
the rule is that the first credits given are the first withdrawn.
The bank's security interest is subject to the provisions of Article 9 on
Secured Transactions except that:
a. no security agreement is needed,
b. no filing is required, and
c. the bank's security interest has priority over conflicting security in-
terests in the item, accompanying documents or proceeds.
If two collecting banks have a security interest in the same item, e.g., where
the depositary bank has allowed the depositor to withdraw and the next collecting
bank has allowed the depositary bank to draw against its correspondent balance
or reserve account, priority between the security interest appears to be determined
by § 400.9-312(5)(b), RSMo 1963 Supp. The claim of the depositary bank or its
receiver would be superior.
36. § 400.3-302, RSMo 1963 Supp. A bank can be a holder in due course even
though it may have taken the check without indorsement, § 400.4-206, RSMo
1963 Supp.; cf. § 400.3-201(3), RSMo 1963 Supp.
37. What set-offs may be valid is left for each state to determine. However,
an intentional crediting of proceeds of an item to the account of a prior bank
known to be insolvent, for the purpose of acquiring a right of set-off would not
produce a valid set-off." Comment 5 to UCC § 4-201.
Granting subsequent collecting banks a security interest for advances to
prior collecting banks is an innovation. Vickrey v. State Say. Ass'n, 21 Fed. 773(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1884) (funds could only be applied against the account of a for-
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or with a Federal Reserve Bank before a final settlement has been received.
The security interest of each bank in the collection chain is satisfied and
discharged upon receipt of a final settlement.
D. Indorsements and Warranties
Rules for determining the responsibilities of collecting banks look to
the indorsements of the holders and prior collecting banks as a prime source
of enlightenment. Viewed strictly as a matter of negotiable instruments
law, it is doubtful whether the indorsement of a holder seeking payment
through an agent is necessary.3 8 Yet in the matter of bank collections, the
indorsements of the holders and prior banks not only identify the parties in-
volved, but are important for establishing the agency status of collecting
banks, conveying instructions as to how the item and the proceeds are to
be handled and determining the rights of the payor bank against the col-
lecting banks in the event the check proves to be defective in some regard.39
This superstructure of deductions about bank relations rests on the
basic assumption that a person receiving a check examines the indorsements
to see what he is getting and will tailor his actions accordingly. Between
individuals, for instance, in the case of the small grocery store or the filling
station which cashes checks for its customers, this probably accords with
the facts. The assumption is less valid in bank collection operations where
a great volume of checks is handled. Normally an intermediate collecting
bank does not examine indorsements on the checks it receives, and its own
indorsements-unvarying in content-are machine stamped on the item as
an adjunct to sorting. To make a collecting bank's duties depend upon an
inscription which it cannot take time to read, or to make the right of a
payor bank to recover from prior parties depend on whether a machine
failed to stamp, may be likened to a requirement that incantations be prop-
erly made.40
The treatment of indorsements in Article 4 is designed to limit their
importance to circumstances where it is reasonable to expect that they
will receive individual attention. As rights and duties arising out of con-
38. Glen Falls Indem. Co. v. Palmetto Bank, 23 F. Supp. 844 (D.C.S.C.
1938), aff'd, 104 F.2d 671 (4th Cir. 1939).
39. The Bank Collection Code, § 402.050, RSMo 1959, placed importance onindorsements. The guaranty of prior indorsements was an automatic concomitant
of a restrictive indorsement but not of a blank indorsement; a blank indorsement
allowed subsequent parties to assume that the bank was the owner of an item.
40. For checks collected through the Federal Reserve System the presence
of a guaranty of prior indorsements is less important because a bank makes the
same warranties by the act of sending a check to the Federal Reserve Bank for
collection. 12 C.F.R. § 210.5 (1963).
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tract have been replaced by those derived from the status of participation
in the bank collection process, it is appropriate that the inscriptions which
have been relied on in determining the substance of the agency agreement
should decline in importance.
Probably the majority of checks which are deposited with banks for
collection bear only the signature of the payee-depositor. Not infrequently,
however, a depositor indorses a check restrictively or fails to indorse it at
all. The restrictive indorser intends that his funds will be handled in the
manner he has specified and heretofore his restrictive indorsement has been
taken as conveying notice of his intentions to all subsequent parties who
may come into possession of the instrument.41 Under Article 4 this rule will
be changed so that a restrictive indorsement is notice only to the bank
in which the check is deposited.42 The draftsmen recognized that the de-
positor or owner of a check has a legitimate interest in having the funds
handled according to his instructions, but felt that a reasonable balance
between safeguarding this interest and leaving collection activities unfet-
tered by special restrictions should be struck by imposing responsibility
on the depositary bank to see that the instructions are observed.
Checks may be deposited with no indorsement either through oversight
or because the payee has arranged to have his check sent directly by his
employer to the bank. Regardless of the necessity of the owner's indorse-
ment of a check being collected, it is uncommon practice for a payor bank
to return an unindorsed check. 43 Contacting the payee to secure his signa-
ture may be an irritating and time consuming solution. In order to facilitate
payment in such cases, banking practice has developed the use of a legend
to be added by the depositary bank stating that the amount of the check
has been credited to the account of the payee. If the payee has received
the amount of the check, he would be in no position to claim damages on the
grounds that the payor bank has converted his check and payor banks
have been prepared to rely upon the assurance of depositary banks that this
has in fact occurred. This practice is recognized and approved in section
400.4-205(1) which allows the depositary bank to supply the missing in-
dorsement of the depositor in the absence of a statement in the instrument
specifically requiring the indorsement of the payee.-
41. Indorsements "for deposit" or "for collection" will still be effective in
preventing a depositary bank from paying cash for a check. §§ 400.3-205-.3-206,
RSMo 1963 Supp.
42. § 400.4-205(2), RSMo 1963 Supp.
43. PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS 2131 (1942).
44. The legend "credited to the account of within named payee" is equivalent
to an indorsement. The authorization in § 400.4-205(1), RSMo 1963 Supp., goes
1961
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Between banks in the chain of collection, any agreed method of transfer
which identifies the transferor will be sufficient.4 5 Perhaps this will con-
tribute to the solution of the problem of the numerous and often illegible
over-stampings that appear on the back of almost any collected check. How-
ever, simplification of indorsement plates to the extent of including only
the transferor bank's transit number does not seem probable for the imme-
diate future because of the continued importance of phrases such as "Pay
any bank."' 6 After an item has been indorsed with words such as "Pay any
bank," only a bank can acquire the rights of a holder in the item until it
has either been returned to the customer initiating collection or has been
specially indorsed by a bank to someone other than a bank. 7
The indorsements of collecting banks have played an important role
in apportioning liability for losses resulting from forgeries or unauthorized
indorsements.4 The assumption that a payor bank could look to the pre-
senting bank or remote prior parties in the event the indorsements were
not proper was upset by judicial decisions that the warranty of validity
which a general indorser gives to subsequent holders in due course did not
extend to the payor and that banks handling checks for collection under a
restrictive indorsement acted merely as agents, assuming no responsibility
for forged indorsements. After the collecting bank had paid over the funds
to its principal or to another agent bank, no possibility of recovering as a
payment made under a mistake of fact remained.49 To remedy this situation,
clearinghouse rules were adopted requiring checks presented by members
to bear the legend "Prior indorsements guaranteed." With the enactment
of Article 4 the assurances of validity of the instrument become attributes
of forwarding an instrument for collection."
further than the previous practice in that the indorsement supplied by the deposi-
tary bank is not merely a guaranty given to the payor bank, but is sufficient to
transfer title to the instrument. Whether the amount has actually been credited
to the payee's account is not open to question and the responsibility for misguided
reliance on the honesty of the depositary bank rests with its depositor rather
than with subsequent banks.
45. § 400.4-206, RSMo 1963 Supp. Presumably agreed identification outside
the check would be sufficient.
46. Indorsing is not necessarily linked to the sorting process. If electronic
encoding becomes widespread the more elaborate indorsement containing "Pay
any bank" could be a concomitant to amount encoding and a simpler indorsement
identifying the transferor could be used in sorting.
47. § 400.4-201(2), RSMo 1963 Supp.
48. § 401.066, RSMo 1959.
49. Cf. Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Bank of Commerce, 107 Mo. 402, 17
S.W. 982 (1891).
50. Warranties can no longer be avoided by a qualified indorsement. See
Trumbull, Bank Deposits and Collections in Illinois Under the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 253 (1960). § 400.3-417(3), RSMo 1963
Supp., is inapplicable in the bank collection situation.
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Two sets of warranties are provided in section 400.4-207: those which
the customer and each collecting bank make to the payor, and those which
the customer and each collecting bank give to every subsequent collecting
bank. The warranties given to the payor are similar to those arising under
the guarantee of prior indorsements and under a bank's general duty to
exercise good faith in its actions. The payor bank or other payor is assured
that the prior parties had good title or are authorized to receive payment
on behalf of one who has good title (which covers the matter of forged or
unauthorized indorsement); that the instrument has not been materially al-
tered;51 and that the party giving the warranty has no knowledge that the
signature of the maker is unauthorized2 By phrasing this last warranty in
terms of good faith rather than an absolute assurance, Article 4 adopts the
rule of Price v. Nea53 to the effect that a drawee is held to know his cus-
tomer's (the drawer's) signature at his peril."
The warranties given by the depositors and each collecting bank to
subsequent collecting banks correspond to those given to the payor except
that the assurance of the validity of the drawer's signature is absolute and
several other matters are included, the most important of which is an un-
dertaking to take up any item which may be dishonored 5
The matter of enforcing the warranties may be greatly simplified, since
each party making a warranty may be held on his undertaking without
joining intervening parties and he remains liable on his warranties even
after remittance of the proceeds has been made.5 6 However, the liability
51. This warranty is limited so as to render the practice of acceptance or
certification of an instrument "as drawn" ineffectual. In the case of an instrument
which has been accepted, a holder in due course and acting in good faith, warrants
against alterations only if he held the instrument prior to acceptance. § 400.4-
207(1) (c), RSMo 1963 Supp. Similar provisions apply to transfers and present-
ments outside the bank collection channels. § 400.3-417(1) (c), RSMo 1963 Supp.
A party who transfers an item after learning of an alteration or of a forged signa-
ture would not be acting in good faith and, therefore, would be liable to the payor.
52. This warranty is also limited in that it is not given by a holder in due
course acting in good faith to the maker or drawer of an instrument, or to the
acceptor, when the holder in due course took the instrument after acceptance.
§ 400.4-207(1)(b), RSMo 1963 Supp. Similar provisions apply to transfers and
presentment outside the bank collection channels. § 400.3-417(1) (b), RSMo 1963
Supp.
53. 3 Burr 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
54. National Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 141 Mo. App. 719, 125 S.W. 513 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1910).
55. Other warranties are (1) that no defense of any party is good against
the party making the warranty, and (2) that he has no knowledge of any in-
solvency proceedings instituted against the maker or acceptor or the drawer of an
unaccepted item. § 400.4-207(d),(e), RSMo 1963 Supp.
56. "Further, the warranties and engagements run with the item with the
result that a collecting bank may sue a remote prior collecting bank or a remote
customer and thus avoid multiplicity of suits." Comment 2 to UCC § 4-207 (1962).
1964]
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of any party on a warranty cannot exceed the amount of consideration he
received plus finance charges and expenses. 57 Unreasonable delay in making
claim on a warranty after the breach is discovered results in discharge of
the person liable to the extent that he has suffered loss through the delay.
E. Pa yment
The point of time in the collection process that an instrument is paid
has often proved critical. When payment is made, the drawer's liability on
the instrument is satisfied. In exchange, the drawee bank becomes account-
able to the owner of the instrument. In the event of the payor bank's
insolvency, whether the events constituting payment have occurred prior
to the suspension of payments determines which party, the drawer or the
payee, must bear the loss even though no remittance of the proceeds has
been made. Not only is payment the pivotal event for determining the loss
between the buyer in a commercial transaction (drawer) and the seller
(payee), it is the point against which directives not to pay the check and
competing claims on the account must rush. An attachment, a stop pay-
ment order or the exercise of a right of set-off by the bank itself comes too
late if the check has been paid.58
At first glance the identification of the acts amounting to payment
would seem a simple matter. 9 The situation comes to mind of the individual
holder presenting a bill of exchange to the drawee's clerk (preferably, a
clerk perched on a high stool and wearing a green eye shade), who can
make an examination of the instrument and his books on the spot and
count out the money if he determines to pay. But this situation has little
resemblance to the circumstances of presentment and payment in modem
banking operations. Examination of the check to make sure that it is in
proper form, that there are sufficient funds in the account, that the order
to pay has not been countermanded, that there is no competing claim on
the funds which must be respected; making entries to the account; and
stamping the check "paid" may take the check through several operational
57. § 400.4-207(3), RSMo 1963 Supp. Cf. § 400.3-217, RSMo 1963 Supp.,
where liability is not limited and which is broad enough to apply in these cases.
But in case of conflict the provisions of Article 4 control. § 400.4-102(1), RSMo
1963 Supp.
58. Payment does not end all rights of the drawee to recover on the check,
as the warranties made by prior parties are designed to be effective after payment.
Payment does, however, end any question as to whether the bank will pay the
particular check or apply the credit in the depositor's account to some competing
purpose.
59. Different actions which have been held to constitute payment are dis-
cussed in Malcolm, Article 4-A Battle with Comlexity, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 265.
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areas. When a bank uses a processing center, checks may even be carried
to other premises.60 To pick one action out of this multistep operation, as
has been the tendency with marking the check "paid","- and say that pre-
cisely at this point payment occurs would inhibit development of new pro-
cedures which might reasonably combine the designated pivotal action with
other steps. Article 4 has wisely broken down the monolithic concept of
the act of making payment into "the process of posting."' ' 2
Payment of a check in the broader sense of substituting accountability
to the payee for that of the payor bank to the drawer involves elements
of both action and time. In determining what actions constitute payment
the question arises whether payment can occur through inactivity.
The growing volume of checks to be processed coupled with the short-
ages of bank personnel which occurred during World War II brought assem-
bly line techniques to the banking industries. Under arrangements to pro-
vide bulk handling, checks coming in from various sources, by mail or
through the clearing house, were accumulated so that they could be
processed at one time, often on the day following receipt,63 in keeping with
established work routines. In order to allay fears that resulting delays might
make a payor bank accountable for a check before it had reached its decision
60. When the operations of determining to pay checks and posting to the
drawers' accounts are conducted away from the bank's premises, presentment
directly to the processing center can be authorized. § 400.4-204(3), RSMo 1963
Supp.
61. Maget v. Bartlett Bros. Land & Loan Co., 226 Mo. App. 416, 41 S.W.2d
849 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931); cf. Rock Island Plow Co. v. Perry, 224 Mo. App. 639,
20 S.W.2d 956 (Spr. Ct. App. 1929) (a check was not paid by marking it "paid"
if no remittance was sent); German-American Bank v. Third Nat'l Bank, 10 Fed.
Cas. 253 (No. 5359) (C.C.D.Mo. 1878) (sending a remittance draft was only a
provisional payment; payment occurred when the remittance was paid).
62. § 400.4-109, RSMo 1963 Supp. The process of posting means the usual
procedure followed in (1) reaching the determination to pay and (2) recording
payment. Inclusion of this definition in the 1962 Official Draft of the Uniform
Commercial Code puts at rest an interesting question concerning the meaning of
'process of posting." Checks are often posted by machine to the drawers' accounts
even though an overdraft may be involved. After the routine posting has been
completed, the matter will be considered by a bank official to determine whether
the overdraft should be accepted. If "process of posting" were read to refer to the
mechanical acts, the check would be paid before it was referred to the official.
Griffiths, Bank Deposits and Collections Before and After the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 23 OIo ST. L. J. 236 (1962). On the contrary, it was suggested that
the process of posting involves decisional as well as mechanical aspects. Huggins &
Phemister, The Illinois Uniform Commercial Code: Article 4-Bank Deposits and
Collections, 50 ILL. B. J. 838 (1962).
63. For a discussion of deferred posting see Brome, Bank Deposits and Col-
lections, 16 LAw & CorrrEMp. PROB. 308 (1951); Leary, Deferred Posting and De-
layed Returns-The Current Check Collection Problem, 62 HAuv. L. REv. 905
(1949).
19
Russell: Russell: Article 4: Bank Deposits and Collections Symposium
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1964
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
to pay or dishonor, "deferred posting" was authorized by statute in many
states" and by the Federal Reserve regulations.65
Authority for deferred posting is continued under section 400.4-301.
Except in the case of an item presented over the counter for immediate
payment (in which case the bank must act expeditiously-work patterns
or no), a bank may take until its midnight deadline (midnight of the next
banking day) to decide whether to pay or dishonor the check. In the case
of "on-us" items deposited with a bank for credit on its books this right
follows as a matter of course; but where checks are received from collecting
banks the payor must make an authorized provisional settlement before
midnight on the day of receipt to be entitled to return dishonored checks
during the next banking day.66 This does not mean that a bank has a
period up until its midnight deadline during which it may "unpay" any
checks it decides it would prefer not to have paid. Once a decision for pay-
ment has been made and carried through, the deferred posting period is
irrelevant.
Within this limitation, payment occurs (other than where an item
presented over the counter is paid in cash) (a) when the payor bank has
given a settlement which it has no right to revoke; (b) when its right to
revoke has expired, as might be the case under a clearinghouse agreement
providing for finality of settlements within a shorter time than the midnight
deadline; or (c) when it has completed the process of posting the item to
the drawer's account. 7 Generally, the same standards determine when a
stop payment order, notice of a competing claim, or the exercise of a right
of set-off comes too late to halt payment-but with the additional require-
ment that the set-off must be exercised, or the notice must arrive, in suf-
ficient time to allow the bank a reasonable opportunity to act before the
process of posting is completed and also before the bank "has evidenced
by examination of the indicated account and by action its decision to pay
the item. '0 8 The draftsmen make it clear that evidencing a "decision to pay"
is not intended to refer to preliminary and provisional actions but to a
determination which leaves only the technicalities to be completed. 9 The
reason for establishing this penumbra of payment is not entirely clear. While
the item remains unpaid as far as discharging the drawer and rendering the
64. See, e.g., § 402.050, RSMo 1959.
65. 12 C.F.R. § 210.5(d) (1963).
66. A settlement other than one approved by § 400.4-207(1), RSMo 1963
Supp., or otherwise agreed to by the presenting bank would not be an "authorized"
settlement and would not give the payor bank the privilege of deferred posting.
67. § 400.4-213, RSMo 1963 Supp.
68. § 400.4-303(1)(d), RSMo 1963 Supp.
69. Comment 3 to UCC § 4-303 (1962).
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drawee bank accountable, it is insulated from all claims and vicissitudes
except the possibility of the drawee bank's insolvency. Perhaps this may
be justified as providing a more easily applied rule for apportioning loss
between the drawer and the owner of the check when, in the context of an
insolvent bank, the evidence of the decisional processes may be hard to find.
Section 400.4-303(2) contains an important provision allowing a bank
to accept, pay or certify checks on the account of a particular drawer in
any order which it finds convenient. The former rule, that a bank must act
upon checks in the order in which they are received,7 0 becomes unworkable
when checks arriving from different sources are accumulated for handling
according to work schedules and are processed by electronic equipment.
F. Settlement and Remittance
Depending upon the type of instrument which is being handled, payor
banks may account to presenting banks, and collecting banks to prior banks
or to the depositor in one of two methods. Under the simpler method
(known as "non-cash" collection) no settlement is made until after the
instrument is paid. Each bank receives the item from the prior party with
the understanding that it will make settlement with its transferor as soon as
it has received the proceeds from the party to whom it has in turn trans-
ferred the instrument. The instrument moves forward through the collection
chain from the depositary to the payor and the proceeds move backward
in exactly reverse order. Under the "cash" collection procedure, used in the
collection of checks (thus accounting for the greater part of the volume
passing through the bank collection system), the journey of items and pro-
ceeds is reduced to a one-way trip except in the case of a dishonored item.
Working on the assumption that over ninety-nine and one-half per cent of
all checks are paid on the first presentation, each bank, when it receives' an
item from a prior bank, makes a provisional settlement with that bank
with the understanding that if the instrument is not paid the provisional
settlement will be reversed. If all goes well and the check is paid, the pro-
visional settlements become final without further notice or action by any-
one. Silence means a successful collection. There are no firm time limits
for converting provisional settlements into final ones,71 though, as a matter
of operating practice, the Federal Reserve Banks and other intermediate col-
70. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 157 Tenn. 497, 10 S.W.2d
683 (1928).
71. When a settlement becomes final is important in determining when the
depositor is entitled to draw against his deposit as of right, § 400.4-213(4), RSMo
1963 Supp. The question may become involved in whether a subsequent check
drawn by the depositor has been wrongfully dishonored.
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lection banks establish availability schedules for funds based partly on the
normal length of time needed for presentment. In the case of an instrument
which has been misrouted by electronic processing equipment, the settle-
ment may remain provisional for an extended length of time.
In making settlements, banks may use either a remittance (either cash
or an instrument) or accounting entries giving the transferor credit on the
payor's books or on the books of the subsequent collecting bank, or con-
versely, charging the transferee's account on the books of the transferor.
The difficulty arises if the bank making the remittance becomes insolvent
and the remittance is dishonored. In such an instance, is the bank accepting
a remittance instrument entitled to turn to the depositor or to prior collec-
tion banks and express its regret at being unable to complete the collection,
or is it to be considered liable for the amount of the remittance? Should the
risk of non-collection of a remittance instrument, as well as the original
check, rest with the depositor or should it fall on the collecting bank? Where
the collecting bank accepts a credit to its account with the insolvent bank, it
is clear that the collecting bank has received payment; the funds have come
to rest where the collecting bank chooses to keep them.72 But a remittance
draft, even if drawn on a bank which is a correspondent of the collecting
bank, or an authorization to charge the payor's account with the collecting
bank requires its own acceptance of the authority to charge or the acqui-
escence of the drawee of the remittance draft before the funds come to rest
where the collecting bank wants them.
The rule developed in the cases was that a bank's agency authorized
it to accept nothing but cash in exchange for an instrument; and if it
accepted any other type of remittance, it was as liable to prior parties as
if it had insisted on and obtained cash.73 Thus, all risk that a remittance
instrument might not be paid was placed on the collecting bank. The
impracticality and expense of transporting innumerable small bags of money
around the country had the result of transforming collecting banks into
guarantors of remittance instruments. This situation was changed by the
Bank Collection Code which provided that the collecting bank might re-
ceive "the check or draft of the drawee or payor bank upon another bank
or the check or draft of any other bank upon any bank other than the
drawee or payor of the item or such method of settlement as may be cus-
72. Maget v. Bartlett Bros. Land & Loan Co., supra note 61.
73. Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U.S. 160 (1924); German-American
Bank v. Third Nat'l Bank, sutpra note 61; Midland Nat'l Bank v. Brightwell, 148
Mo. 358, 49 S.W. 994 (1899); National Bank of Commerce v. American Exch.
Bank, 151 Mo. 320, 52 S.W. 265 (1899); Landa v. Traders' Bank, 118 Mo. App.
356, 94 S.W. 770 (K.C. Ct. App. 1906).
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tomary in a local clearinghouse or between clearing banks or otherwise"
without becoming responsible as a debtor? This permission continues under
section 400.4-211 which gives the collecting bank authority to accept the
check of the remitting bank or another bank on any bank except the re-
mitting bank or an authority from the remitting bank to charge its account
or another bank's account with the collecting bank. Cashiers checks or cer-
tified checks or other bank obligations are acceptable when the payor is a
person other than a bank; a bank's own obligation is acceptable when the
remitting bank and the collecting bank clear through the same clearing
house or group. This last provision is not included to allow a bank to sub-
stitute one primary obligation for another, but because this may be the
most expeditious means of obtaining the funds, where both banks exchange
checks through the same clearinghouse. If a bank goes beyond the types
of instruments approved in the statute (or, presumably, by modifying
agreements) and authorizes remittance in a different manner, it is liable
to the same extent as if it had received cash if the remittance instrument
proves uncollectable.7
5
While a collecting bank is protected in following the commercial nec-
essity of accepting a recognized type of remittance draft, it is placed under
the duty of acting promptly to secure its payment. This is an area where
detailed provisions are new. If a bank allows the midnight deadline to pass
without deciding whether to honor an authorization to charge the remitting
bank's account, or without forwarding a remittance instrument for collec-
tion, the settlement becomes final and the collecting bank is answerable
to its transferor. However, if the collecting bank acts within the time period
permitted to collect the remittance instrument (and this applies to an un-
approved type of remittance not authorized by the collecting bank, on the
theory that the depositor's interest would be better served by trying to
collect the irregular remittance instrument), it does not become liable for
the amount of the remittance until it receives a final settlement for the re-
mittance instrument. The process could become extended: if, for instance,
the remittance draft is on a third bank which is also not a correspondent
of the collecting bank, it may be paid by another remittance draft on yet a
fourth bank. This situation can be prolonged almost at will, but the point
when the collecting bank's liability for having received a final settlement for
74. §§ 402.090-.100, RSMo 1959.
75. § 400.4-211(3) (b), RSMo 1963 Supp. A collecting -bank authorizing an
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the original item arises is not reached until the credit has come to rest in a
place acceptable to the collecting bank.7 6
In a collection of a particular item both credits and the remittance
drafts may be employed, as where all banks prior to the presenting bank
have given provisional credit for items but, because the presenting bank
and the payor bank are not correspondents, the payor bank returns a
remittance draft on its city correspondent. The payment of the remittance
draft results in final settlement being received by the presenting bank
which in turn has the instantaneous chain reaction effect of causing all the
provisional credits given by prior collecting banks to become final.
G. Return of Dishonored Checks
For the one-half of one per cent of checks which are not paid on pre-
sentment, current banking practices dictate that they shall retrace their
path bank by bank until they are returned to the bank of deposit and
charged back to the depositor. As an alternative, and admittedly novel,
means of handling dishonored items, section 400.4-212(2) provides that
the payor bank or an intermediary collecting bank may return an unpaid
item directly to the depositary bank. If the returning bank has settled for
the unpaid item, it may recover the amount by sending a draft on the de-
positary bank, which, if it has received a provisional settlement, must
reimburse the returning bank. All provisional credits which have been given
throughout the chain of collection are allowed to become final.
The practice of direct returns was advocated as a method of shortening
the time needed to get notice to the depositary bank that an item will not
be paid. The advantages to be realized over present procedures may not be
striking because of the current practice of sending a telegraphic notice of
nonpayment when the amount of the dishonored instrument is $1,000 or
more.77 Direct returns do not promise a substantial reduction in the num-
ber of steps of the collection system, since collecting a draft for reimburse-
ment from the depositary bank would require the intervention of a number
of banks substantially equal to that required to return the unpaid check.
Other problems with regard to direct returns remain unresolved, including
the rights of a payor bank to look to the intermediate collecting banks if
the expected remittance from the depositary bank does not materialize.78
76. § 400.4-211, RSMo 1963 Supp.
77. See the uniform instructions of the Federal Reserve Banks, Operating
Letter No. 9 of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, September 1, 1964, p. 9.
78. The problems are discussed ii CLARKE, BAILEY & YOUNG, BANK DEPOSrrS
AND CoLLEcrioNs 102 (3rd ed. 1963).
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Notwithstanding the difficulties, the concept of direct returns offers a key
to electronic handling of dishonored checks should the volume of return
items become great enough to make automation imperative.
Encoding the identification of each collecting bank in a manner which
could be machine "read" selectively so as to allow return through the col-
lection chains is beyond the competence of present equipment. However,
the bank which encodes the initial amount (frequently not the depositary
bank and there is no present authorization for direct returns to an inter-
mediate bank) could encode its own transit number in a separate field
which could be "read" in directing the return. Probably the advantages of
automating the return desk will be outweighed by the unresolved difficulties
until there is a far reaching reassessment of the role of intermediate col-
lecting banks, and direct returns will remain an instance where the ingenu-
ities of innovators is over-balanced by the weight of established procedures.
II. TE PAYOR BANK AND ITS CUSTOMER
The focus of Article 4, Part 4, shifts to the rights and the obligations
which arise between a bank and its customer from the bank's action in
paying or not paying checks drawn on the depositor's account.70 An ex-
haustive treatment of the relationship involved in a checking account is
beyond the scope of Part 4. It is concerned with the circumstances under
which a bank may properly charge its customer's account for the amount
of checks it has paid, the responsibilities which rest upon the depositor to
help his bank discover errors and the liabilities which are incurred by the
bank through improper payment or refusal to pay.
A. The Bank's Autiority to Pay
A bank which pays a check expects to charge the drawer-depositor's
account for the amount which it has disbursed or for which it has become
liable. Although in some instances, extraneous factors, such as the depos-
itor's own negligence,80 the passage of time,8' or his inability to show that
he has suffered any loss 8 2 may preclude the depositor from objecting to the
charge, the question of whether a bank is entitled to charge the depositor's
account usually turns .upon whether it has acted within the authority its
depositor has given it. This involves a consideration of the scope of the
79. It has been argued that the provisions of Part 4 are not properly included
in the Uniform Commercial Code. Maldolm, Article 4-A Battle with Complexity,.
supra note 59.
80. § 400.3-406, RSMo 1963 Supp.
81. § 400.4-404, RSMo 1963 Supp.
82. § 400.4-403, RSMo 1963 Supp.
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authority-was the particular check which the bank paid one which comes
within the general or specific instructions, expressed or implied, given by
the depositor as to the type of instrument which the bank is to pay?--and
a question of time-was the authority given by the depositor still operative
at the time the bank made payment?
The basic rule that a bank is entitled to reimbursement for payment
made in accordance with the depositor's instructions is stated obliquely in
section 400.4-401 which provides that a bank may charge the customer's
account for any item which is otherwise properly payable even though an
overdraft is created.8 3
1. Incomplete and Altered Checks
Difficulties arise when a bank has paid a check which, although not
a forgery, does not conform strictly to the instructions issued by the de-
positor. This situation may occur when the check left the drawer's pos-
session signed but otherwise incomplete and was subsequently completed
in an unauthorized manner, or where the check has been 'materially altered.
In most instances, the difference between these two situations is likely to
be no more than whether the amount line of a check was left completely
blank or whether enough space was left in the amount as written to permit
it to be raised. In either case, whether the bank or its customer must bear
the loss turns upon whether the customer acted with reasonable care and
whether the payor bank acted in good faith and in accordance with reason-
able commercial practice. Signing blank checks can scarcely be squared with
reasonable care. Consequently, an item which has left the drawer's posses-
sion uncompleted can be charged to the drawer's account according to its
terms as subsequently completed unless the bank has notice that the com-
pletion was improper.84
83. The Official Comment is more explicit: "It is fundamental that upon
proper payment of a draft the drawee may charge the account of the drawer."
Comment 1 to UCC § 4-401 (1962). Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962). Under Missouri cases, an overdraft
made the customer the debtor of the bank. Vandagrift v. Masonic Home of Mis-
souri, 242 Mo. 138, 145 S.W. 448 (1912); Bank of Darlington v. Atwood, 225 Mo.
App. 974, 47 S.W.2d 1097 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930). Cf. S. S. Allen Grocery Co. v.
Bank of Buchanan County, 192 Mo. App. 476, 182 S.W. 777 (K.C. Ct. App. 1916)(when an overdraft is involved, a bank purchases rather than pays a check).
84. The rule under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, § 401.015,
RSMo 1959, that an uncompleted and undelivered instrument is not a valid con-
tract in the hands of any holder, is reversed in the Uniform Commercial Code.§§ 400.3-115, .3-407, RSMo 1963 Supp. Missouri cases reached results similar to
those indicated under the Uniform Commercial Code. World Tire Corp. v. Mutual
Bank & Trust Co., 174 S.W.2d 230 (St. L. Mo. App. 1943) (the provision that an
uncompleted, undelivered instrument is not a valid contract has no application
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When a check turns out to have been materially altered, a bank which
has paid it in good faith may charge the drawer's account in accordance
with the original tenor of the item.s5 The bank's position is amplified when
this rule is read together with section 400.3-406, declaring that a drawer
whose negligence has substantially contributed81 - to the alteration is pre-
cluded from asserting it against a drawee who pays in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable commercial practice. In view of the growing
reliance upon electronic equipment in posting checks, it is probable that an
alteration which escapes the depositary bank and the bank encoding the
amount of the check will be paid under circumstances meeting the latter
conditions.
2. Stale Checks and Stop Payment Orders
The authority of a bank to make payment may be affected either by
the passage of time during which a particular item has been outstanding
or by the occurrence of specific events which terminate the bank's author-
ity either as to particular items or generally as to all outstanding items of
the drawer.
Under the case law, a check bearing a date many months before pre-
sentment placed a bank in a dilemma of deciding whether it should make
payment and run the risk that a court might decide the check was stale and
that consequently the bank was under a duty to inquire as to its right to
pay, 7 or to refuse payment and risk the drawer's complaint with which
another court might agree, that the check was wrongfully dishonored.
Missouri statutes settled the matter by providing that a bank incurred no
liability in refusing to pay a check presented more than one year after its
between the drawer and his bank); S. S. Allen Grocery Co. v. Bank of Buchanan
County, supra note 83 (drawer estopped by negligence from denying validity of
instrument).
The question of what action a bank may take if it receives notice of an un-
authorized completion after it has become accountable for the check but before
it has charged the drawer's account is resolved by § 400.4-303, RSMo 1963 Supp.,
which provides that any notice received by a bank after it becomes accountable
for an item comes too late to affect the bank's right to charge the customer's ac-
count.
85. On similar rights of a holder in due course, see § 400.3-407(3), RSMo
1963 Supp.; cf. § 401.124, RSMo 1959.
86. When negligence substantially contributes to a forgery, the drawer may
also be barred from asserting that defect. In the case of an alteration, apparently
a drawee bank could elect to waive its claim for negligence against the drawer and
sue prior parties on their warranties under § 400.4-207, RSMo 1963 Supp.; cf.§ 400.4-407(5), RSMo 1963 Supp.
87. PATObr, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS 1107 (1942). Goldberg v. Manu-
facturers Trust Co., 199 Misc. 167, 102 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Mun. Ct. N.Y. 1951) (a
stale check places a duty on the bank to inquire before payment).
1964]
27
Russell: Russell: Article 4: Bank Deposits and Collections Symposium
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1964
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
date unless expressly instructed to make payment.88 The period within
which a check becomes "stale" will now be reduced to six months.8 9 More
importantly, a drawee bank is now given explicit authority to pay "stale'
checks provided it acts in good faith. Since magnetic ink encoding does not
show the date of checks, many banks may look to this permission as re-
lieving them of making visual inspection of the date of all checks and it is
likely that an increasing number of stale checks will be routinely paid. A
drawer who does not want a long outstanding check paid would be well
advised to give his bank explicit instructions.
Termination of the authority to pay a specific item also occurs through
the countermand of the instructions from the drawer. Stop payment orders,
which Lord Ellenborough somewhat expansively described as converting
the check into a "piece of waste paper" as far as the payor bank was con-
cerned,00 have generally been a source of vexation to banks. The trouble
involved in observing them is likely to be out of proportion to any charge
the bank can make. Nevertheless, the draftsmen of the Code have con-
cluded that the right to stop payment on an outstanding check "is a
service which depositors expect and are entitled to receive notwithstanding
its difficulty, inconvenience and expense." 91 The privilege of stopping pay-
ment is, however, limited to the drawer of the item.9 2
Stop payment orders may be either oral or written; an oral order
binds the bank for fourteen days, and a written order, for six months.93
All extensions must be in writing and are binding for six months. Although
the length of time of the effectiveness of oral stop payment has been re-
88. §§ 362.370, 363.610, RSMo 1959.
89. § 400.4-404, RSMo 1963 Supp.
90. Wienhold v. Spitta, 3 Comp. 376, 170 Eng. Rep. 1416 (1813). For a dis-
cussion of stop payment orders, see Morrison & Sneed, Bank Collections: The Stop
Payment Transaction-A Comparative Study, 32 TExAs L. REv. 259 (1954);
Comment, 20 U. Cli. L. REv. 667 (1953).
91. Comment 2 to UCC § 4-403 (1962).
92. Several Missouri cases involve circumstances where payment was refused
by a bank because the payee or a subsequent holder had requested the drawee to
stop payment. Farmers' Exch. Bank v. Farm & Home Savings & Loan Ass'n, 332
Mo. 1041, 61 S.W.2d 717 (1933); Bank of Aurora v. Fruit Growers' Union, 52
S.W.2d 574 (Spr. Mo. App. 1932). These could be explained by reasoning that the
owner had revoked the agency of the collecting banks. But see § 400.4-203, RSMo
1963 Supp., making a bank answerable only to the instructions of its immediate
transferor. The payee who wishes to prevent payment may have a remedy under
§ 400.3-603(1), RSMo 1963 Supp.
The Uniform Commercial Code broadens the right to give stop payment orders
to include not only the drawers of checks, but also the makers of any other in-
strument payable at a bank.
93. § 400.4-403, RSMo 1963 Supp.
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duced,.4 in practical operations and litigation, the oral stop payment order
may be expected to continue to be the customary practice. The situation
where a stop payment order will be given is often one where the buyer-
drawer, either with or without good reason, has become disenchanted with
his bargain and would prefer to have the money in his hands while he and
the seller squabble or litigate. Very likely the payee will not be unaware
of his feelings, and there is apt to be a race between the drawer and the
payee to see who can make it to the payor bank firstY5 While a stop pay-
ment order must be given "at such time and in such manner as to afford
the bank a reasonable opportunity to act," no provision is made for solving
the operating problems of what information must be contained in a stop
payment order, how the drawee bank can assure itself that its customer
is on the other end of the phone or how a drawee bank can establish, in a
dispute with its depositor, that an oral stop payment order was never re-
ceived.9 6 The customer has the burden of establishing the amount of his
loss when a stop payment order has not been honored.9
3. Death or Incompetency
A bank's authority to pay the checks of a depositor is, according to
the general rules of agency, terminated when the depositor dies or becomes
incompetent."" Section 400.4-405 restates and refines this rule, making it
plain that bank officers need not read the obituary columns or draw the
line between eccentricity and lunacy at their peril. The bank's authority
to pay checks is not revoked until it has actual knowledge of death or of an
adjudication of incompetence. An adjudication of incompetence does not
94. §§ 362.365, 363.600, RSMo 1959. While the statutes are not explicit, an
initial stop payment order can probably be either oral or in writing. See, Com-
mittee On Legislative Research General Assembly of the State of Missouri, Pro-
posed Uniform Commercial Code: Its Effect Upon Cognate Missouri Statutes, 192(1954).
95. "The order must be received in such time and in such manner as to
afford the bank a reasonable opportunity to act ... ." § 400.4-403(1), RSMo 1963
Supp.; cf. Albers v. Commercial Bank, 85 Mo. 173 (1884) (bank has burden of
proving that stop payment order was not timely).
96. The problem may be aggravated because a bank cannot rely upon ex-
culpatory agreements which it may have in its contract with its depositor and
which might be considered as relieving the bank of its duty to use ordinary care.
A bank may still be able to include exculpatory clauses in cases where the stop
payment order is missed because the amount of the check was erroneously encoded
and thus was able to escape detection in electronic processing.
97. Some consolation for banks is found in Dinger v. Market Street Trust
Co., 69 Dauph. 236, 7 Pa.D. & C.2d 674 (C.P. 1956) (the customer alleging a
stop payment must show when it was given and to whom).
98. Fisher v. Bagnell, 194 Mo. App. 581, 186 S.W. 1097 (St. L. Ct. App. 1916);
Lewis v. International Bank, 13 Mo. App. 202 (St. L. Ct. App. 1883).
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have the effect of providing constructive notice. In this respect, the p'resent
Missouri rule is continued.,,
Section 400.4-405 introduces a new rule for Missouri. Following the
satisfactory experience of a number of state statutes, provision is made
that a bank may, even after it is aware of the death of its customer, con-
tinue to pay his checks 0o for ten days following the date of his death. "The
justification is that such checks normally are given in immediate payment
of an obligation, that there is almost never any reason why they should
not be paid, and ihat filing in probate is a useless formality, burdensome
to the holder, the executor, the court and the bank." 10' This authority is
permissive and imposes no obligation upon the drawee bank to pay any
check. While this provision is not intended to prevent an executor or admin-
istrator from recovering payments from the party who has received them
or stop any interested party from questioning the validity of a transfer in
contemplation of death, a bank would render better service in suspicious
circumstances, or where unusual amounts are involved, by refusing payment
on the check and leaving the holder to file a claim in probate. Furthermore,
a bank's authority to pay after the death of the depositor can be terminated
by any person claiming an interest in the estate. The bank is not called
upon to determine whether or not his claim is justified.
B. Responsibilities of the Customer
The ability of a bank customer to compel his bank to recredit his ac-
count depends upon his compliance with two time limits for discovering and
reporting irregularities.102 First, after his paid checks are made available to
99. Caldwell v. First Nat'l Bank, 283 S.W.2d 921 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 120 (1958).
100. See PATON, op. cit. supra note 87 at 1085. Leary, Article 4: Bank Deposits
and Collections Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 15 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 565
(1959).
The authority to continue payment after knowledge of the drawer's death
is limited to checks.
101. Comment 3 to UCC § 4-405 (1962).
102. § 400.4-406, RSMo 1963 Supp., differs from the present statute, § 401.201,
RSMo 1959, in that:(a) unauthorized indorsements as well as unauthorized signatures are covered.
But see, Royal Indem. Co. v. Poplar Bluff Trust Co., 223 Mo. App. 908, 20 S.W.2d
971 (Spr. Ct. App. 1929); contra American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust
Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S.W.2d 1034 (1934) (no duty to examine indorsements);
(b) all items paid by a bank, not merely checks are included; -
(c) holding paid items and giving notice becomes an 'acceptable procedure only
if it is requested by the customer or is reasonable under the particular circum-
stances, e.g., when the whereabouts of the customer are unknown;(d) the period in which the customer can object is less than the stated max-
imum when it can be shown that the customer failed to act with reasonable care
and promptness. But see, Ward v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 Mo. App. 472, 27 S.W.2d
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him (through returning them, or holding them in accordance with his in-
structions, or in some other reasonable manner), he must exercise reason-
able care and promptness to discover and report his unauthorized signature
and any alterations.1 3 Second, regardless of the care or negligence with
which he acts, he is precluded from making a claim after the passage of
certain stated periods. 1'0
With regard to a particular item in dispute, if the payor bank can
establish that the customer has not acted with reasonable promptness and
care and that as a consequence it has suffered a loss, the customer is pre-
cluded from asserting that his signature was unauthorized or that there was
an alteration. The problem which confronts a bank in this situation is to
establish that the customer's failure to report is causally related to the
loss it has suffered. When a bank pays on an unauthorized signature, the
loss results from its initial delusion in making the improper payment, rather
than from the customer's failure to find the irregularity promptly, except in
the unlikely circumstance that the delay has deprived the bank of recourse
against a solvent culprit. In cases where an alteration is involved, the same
considerations apply except that the payor bank often has the added pos-
sibility of avoiding loss through enforcement of its guarantee against ma-
terial alterations upon prior collecting banks.
In addition, if the same wrongdoer has put through other items bear-
ing unauthorized signatures or alterations which have been paid by the
bank between the time when the first improper one has been available to
the customer for a reasonable period (fourteen days is conclusively pre-
sumed to be a reasonable period and a lesser time may be) and the time
when the bank receives notice of the irregularity, the customer cannot
complain about those payments. The reasoning behind this provision is that
alerting the bank to the existence of improper practices is an excellent
protection against their repeated success. 0 5 There is no requirement that
1066 (Spr. Ct. App. 1930) (the statute does not relieve a customer of the need
to act diligently); Kenneth Inv. Co. v. National Bank of the Republic, 103 Mo.
App. 613, 77 S.W. 1002 (St. L. Ct. App. 1903) (depositor must examine vouchers
within a reasonable time, but is not estopped if bank was also negligent); McKeen
v. Boatman's Bank, 74 Mo. App. 281 (St. L. Ct. App. 1898); Wind v. Fifth Nat'I
Bank, 39 Mo. App. 72 (St. L. Ct. App. 1899) (forged indorsements).
103. § 400.4-406(1), RSMo 1963 Supp.
104. § 400.4-406(4), RSMo 1963 Supp.
105. "One of the most serious consequences of failure of a customer to comply
with the requirements of subsection (1) is the opportunity presented to the
wrongdoer to repeat his misdeeds. Conversely, one of the best ways to keep down
losses in this type of situation is for the customer to promptly examine his state-
ment and notify the bank of any unauthorized signature or alteration so that the
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the bank be misled through reliance on the first signature when it decides
to pay the later items. In either of these cases the customer may reply by
showing that the bank failed to exercise ordinary care in paying the item.
However, without regard to the negligence or impeccable care of either
the payor bank or its customers, claims arising out of payment of an item
bearing an unauthorized signature of the customer or an alteration are
barred if not asserted within one year after the paid items are made
available; in addition, claims based on an unauthorized indorsement are
barred if not asserted within three years. The reason given for the un-
qualified termination date as to indorsements, even though the customer
may have no way of learning of the forgery until the payee complains, is
that "the balance in favor of a mechanical termination of the liability of
the bank outweighs what few residuary risks the customer may still
have.,)106
The final provision of section 400.4-406 is tailored to put an end to the
practice whereby a payor bank, motivated by business judgment and the
desire to maintain good customer relations, decides to waive the defense
of its customer's tardiness and sue prior collecting banks for breach of
their warranties of valid indorsements.1 0 T It is provided that a payor bank
which waives or fails upon request to assert a valid defense against its own
customer cannot assert a claim based on the unauthorized signature or al-
teration against any prior party.1 8
With the development of check handling by electronic equipment, the
important question is apt to become whether the customer is under any
duty to examine his checks or his bank statement to discover errors made
somewhere along the collection path in encoding the amount of his check
106. Comment 5 to UCC § 4-406 (1962). The bank's liability to persons other
than its customer is not "mechanically" terminated according to this time schedule.
Payment of a check bearing a forged indorsement constitutes conversion of the
property of the true owner. § 400.3-419(1) (c), RSMo 1963 Supp.; Good Roads
Mach. Co. v. Broadway Bank, 267 S.W. 40 (K.C. Mo. App. 1924). An aggrieved
payee can be expected to raise his claim against the payor bank at least as readily
as he will against the drawer who may have no liability for his loss.
107. National Sur. Corp. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 188 Misc. 207, 70 N.Y.S.2d
636 (Manhattan Munic. Ct. 1946), aff'd without opinion, 188 Misc. 213, 70 N.Y.S.2d
642 (Sup. Ct. 1946). See Clarke, Bank Deposits and Collections, 16 ARK. L. REv.
45 (1961).
108. § 400.4-406(5), RSMo 1963 Supp. Query whether this provision may not
involve some difficulty where a customer has delayed unreasonably in reporting
material alterations. "Loss" as used in the requirement of § 400.4-406(2) (a),
RSMo 1963 Supp., that a bank must establish that it has suffered, must mean
a loss which cannot be recovered from other sources. In this circumstance the cus-
tomer's claim can be resisted only if the bank has sustained a loss; the bank
has sustained a loss only if the warranties are unenforceable; the warranties are
unenforceable only if the customer's claim can be defeated.
[Vol. 29
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and which have resulted in an overcharge to his account. It is doubtful
that erroneous amount encoding in magnetic ink characters could be con-
sidered an alteration of the check which would bring it within section
400.4-406. The problem appears to be one for which a solution must be
developed through bank-customer agreements.
C. The Measure of the Payor Bank's Liability
1. Wrongful Dishonor
A bank is under a duty to pay the checks of a depositor upon presenta-
tion if the account of the depositor is sufficient. A breach of this duty will
render the bank liable for ensuing damages." 9 At common law a merchant
or trader was presumed to have suffered damage to his reputation when
his check had been wrongfully dishonored. Consequently, he could recover
from the drawee without proving actual damages. 10 This rule has been
altered by statute in Missouri so that, except where malice is involved,
the depositor's recovery is limited to the amount of actual damages he has
alleged and can prove;'1 this changed rule is continued by section 400.4-
40112 Whether arrest or prosecution of the depositor can be considered
damages caused by the dishonor of a check has been a vexatious question.
In Missouri such an occurrence was held too remote because it involved
the independent judgment of the holder who could reasonably have been
expected to investigate before taking drastic action.', This position will
now be reversed by a provision that "whether any consequential damages
are proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor is a question of fact to
be determined in each case.""14
2. Subrogation for Improper Payments
In the reverse situation where a bank has paid a check contrary to its
authorization, circumstances may combine to reduce the bank's liability.
109. Farmers' Bank v. Moberly, 229 Mo. App. 595, 78 S.W.2d 906 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1935); Johnson v. Farmers' Bank, 223 Mo. App. 513, 11 S.W.2d 1090 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1928); Claxton v. Cantley, 297 S.W. 975 (Spr. Mo. App. 1927).
110. Third Nat'l Bank v. Ober, 178 Fed. 678 (8th Cir. 1910).
111. § 401.200, RSMo 1959. Note that § 401.208, RSMo 1959, prevents recov-
ery of damages on an inland bill if payment with interest and protest charges is
made within 20 days. This provision will be repealed and no equivalent provision
is contained in Article 4.
112. Wrongful dishonor creates liability only to the depositor and does not
give a cause of action to the payee. See Richardson v. Empire Trust Co., 230 Mo.
App. 580, 94 S.W.2d 966 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936).
113. Waggoner v. Bank of Bernie, 220 Mo. App. 165, 281 S.W. 130 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1926).
114. §400.4-402, RSMo 1963 Supp.
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To prevent either the customer-drawer or the holder of the check from
being unjustly enriched, the bank is given certain rights of subrogation.11B
Against the customer, the drawer is subrogated to the rights of any holder
in due course or any rights which the payee or other holder may have had
on the transaction which gave rise to the disputed instrument. Conversely,
if the customer had a valid claim on the underlying transaction against
the payee or other holder, the bank which has made an erroneous payment
is subrogated to that claim. This ability to climb into the shoes of the
party who is "in the right" provides substantial protection but it may not
be the answer to all of the bank's worries. When it is impossible to join
all the parties in one action, the bank may still find itself with the problem
of deciding which shoes it wants and then convincing a court of the cor-
rectness of its decision.""o Possibility of double recovery is removed by the
provision that the rights of subrogation exist only so far as necessary to
prevent loss to the bank.
III. VARIATioN BY AGREEmENT
Probably no other provision of Article 4 has drawn as much criticism
as section 400.4-103 which permits the statutory rules for bank collections
and deposits to be varied by agreements between banks and their customers
or among banks.11 7 This a~uthority is viewed by its critics as little better
than a carte blanche in unreliable bankers' handse 8 and even advocates of
the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code have expressed doubts
as to the advisability of this provision." 9
Clearly the past development of bank collection procedures has oc-
curred through contracts and the growth of customs for handling and
transmitting items among banks. A customer who avails himself of the
service of his bank for collecting his checks has been presumed to agree to
performance in keeping with the usual practices. Matters such as the
time limits within which a bank must take action on an item which it
receives for collection or for payment, the guarantees which a prior bank
gives to the payor bank or to a subsequent collecting bank, the methods
which may be used in transmitting instruments from one place to another,
and the types of remittances which a bank may accept in payment of items
115. § 400.4-407, RSMo 1963 Supp.
116. Leary, supra note 100.
117. Cf. § 400.1-102(2), RSMo 1963 Supp., which deals generally with the
power to vary the provision of the Uniform Commercial Code by agreement.
118. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform (?) Commercial Code Should Not Be
Adopted, 61 YALE L. J. 334 (1952).
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all were settled through agreements between the banks and their customers
contained in deposit slips, passbooks or similar documents, clearinghouse
rules and regulations of the Federal Reserve System.
The opponents of continuing and giving statutory recognition to such
consensual arrangements argue that the revision and codification of the
law dealing with bank collections afford an excellent opportunity to pro-
vide equitable rules for the settlement of future disputes. The bank
customer who deposits his checks for collection is in no position to ham-
mer out any agreements as to how his checks are to be handled even if he
happens to be a lawyer with a passable understanding of how the collection
system operates. The advocates of inflexible rules feared that the banking
system might use its power to rewrite collection practices in a manner
which would shift the possibilities of loss, even from bank negligence, onto
the bank's customers.
The difficulty with this argument is that it requires a greater degree of
omniscience that can be reasonably expected from legislative draftsmen.
With the probabilities of even further substantial increases in the great
volume of checks which are passing back and forth continuously, and
with the initiation of radical changes in the mechanics of check procession,
exact rules, perhaps appropriate for the present, may become the hobbles
of new procedures.
The term "agreement" as used in section 400.4-103 contemplates a
much wider range than the consensual arrangement between the bank and
its customers. Federal Reserve regulations and operating letters, clearing-
house rules and similar arrangements are binding upon the depositor even
though he has not given his express consent and may be unaware of their
existence. Any agreement which may be entered into to vary the effect
of the provisions of Article 4 is subject to the limitation that it cannot ex-
cuse a bank's liability for failure to act with good faith and exercise ordi-
nary care or limit the damages which may be recovered for such failure.
However, the agreement may establish the standard by which a bank's
performance of its obligations is to be measured if such standard is not
manifestly unreasonable . 20
Probably neither the efficacy or the dangers of the power to vary the
rights and duties of the parties through agreement are .as great as the advo-
cates or opponents supposed. Any agreement would fall substantially short
of being universal. Even the most inclusive-Federal Reserve regulations-
would apply only to checks which are handled through the Federal Re-
120. § 400.4-103(1), RSMo 1963 Supp.
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serve System. As a result, substantial variation by agreement could mean
that the rules which apply to a particular check could vary with the hap-
penstance of what collection route was employed and that the expected
benefits of uniformity would be jeopardized. Agreements may hold the solu-
tion to meeting local problems or experimenting with minor innovations,
but substantial alterations will probably have to depend upon statutory
amendments. The trend in this regard is evidenced by the changes which
have already been made to resolve some of the areas of suspected difficulty
in Article 4.121
While the need for flexibility is evident in the high-volume, rapidly
developing check collection operation, to what extent do similar considera-
tions apply to the relations between the payor bank and its customer?
Certainly automation holds as much promise for simplifying the posting of
checks within a payor bank as it does for expediting collections between
banks. As automation has progressed, banks rely more and more heavily
on the machines and have tended to reduce manual examinations of
checks.222 The risks which are inherent in such procedure are balanced
against the economies a bank may hope to effect. In order to reach a sound
business decision, it is important to know precisely what risks a bank is
accepting if it decides to forego rigorous manual inspections. The danger
that a forgery will be paid is an obvious risk, but other situations are less
clear cut. In order to charge the customer's account with a stale check it
has paid, a bank must have acted in good faith; the amount it can charge
for an altered check depends upon whether the bank has acted in good
faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards; and the
bank's ability to complain if it suffers loss because its customer does not
exercise reasonable care in the discovery and reporting of forgeries is lost
if it can be shown that the bank itself did not use ordinary care in paying
the forged item. The meaning of "good faith" is expressly stated.122 "Rea-
sonable commercial practice" and "ordinary care" remain subject to in-
terpretation. It seems likely that in this area agreements between banks
121. §§ 400.4-109, .4-204(3), RSMo 1963 Supp. These 1962 amendments were
intended to forestall possible difficulties in the meaning of "process of posting"
and as to the validity of off-premises presentments. As to the latter point, see
Clarke, Electronic Brains for Banks, 17 Bus. LAw. 532 (1962); Funk, Presentment
Under the Uniform Commercid Code-A Reply to Mr. Clarke, 17 Bus. LAw. 548(1962).
122. The extent to which reliance is placed upon electronic processing is shown
by the difficulties created by certified checks which the machine may still charge
to the drawer's account. See Windsor, The Certified Check, 81, BANKING L. J. 480(1964).
123. § 400.1-201(19), RSMo 1963 Supp.: "good faith, means honesty in fact"
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and their customers legitimately may be expected in order to make the
payor bank's duties and risk more precise.
However, when the matter shifts from filling in the blank areas in
bank-customer relationships, to changing the effect of the provisions of
Part 4, freedom of agreement may have been less thoroughly considered.
The apparent motivation for the inclusion of the rules of Part 4 was that
these are services which a customer should be able to expect and which
consequently should be removed from the area of agreement and fixed by
statute. To say, then, that the time allowed the customer for discovering
and reporting irregularities may be shortened at will, that a bank may be
permitted to charge the customer's account for altered checks according to
their tenor as altered, or that a customer may be precluded from giving any
stop payment orders at all, seems to involve an inconsistent approach.
Despite this, however, the dangers from agreements in this area should
not be overestimated. Any agreements to vary the provisions of Part 4 will
usually be contained in various documents which the customer is given or
which he signs.12' In addition to the restraints which competition may im-
pose on the terms which a bank may submit for the customer's consent,
such agreements, although now recognized by statute, are not insulated
from judicial scrutiny. Standards which have been applied in the past,
such as lack of effective consent, lack of consideration or violation of public
policy, will continue to be available to curtail unconscionable agreements. 12
IV. CONCLUSION
Out of the many hours of study which separate the present date from
July 1, 1965, Article 4 can expect to claim only a modest number. Com-
pared to the changed rules and new concepts which are found in some
articles of the Uniform Commercial Code, the provisions of Article 4 have
124. The extent to which Federal Reserve regulations or clearinghouse rules
can govern this area is doubtful. "There is, of course, no intention of authorizing a
local clearing house or a group of clearing houses to rewrite the basic law generally.
The term, 'clearing house rules' should be understood in the light of functions the
clearing houses have exercised in the past." Comment 3 to UCC § 4-103 (1962).
125. Agreements exculpating a bank from liability for failure to observe stop
payment orders have been considered lacking in consideration: Calamita v. Trades-
mens Nat'l Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A.2d 46 (1949); Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 16 NJ. Super. 430, 84 A.2d 741 (1951), aff'd, 9 N.J. 607,
89 A.2d 242 (1952); or against public policy, Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank, 376 Pa.
181, 101 A.2d 910 (1954).
Whether a bank customer gives consent to terms printed on deposit slip or
in a checking account pass book, may be a question of fact. Los Angeles Inv. Co.
v. Home Say. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 Pac. 293 (1919); Ryan v. Columbia Nat'l
Bank, 142 S.C. 231, 140 S.E. 593 (1927). On consent by bank customers to terms
which are not signed, see Annots. 5 A.L.R. 1203 (1920), 60 A.L.R.2d 708 (1958).
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the appearance of .old acquaintances. Except for some alterations in the
relations between a payor bank and its customer,. they. are basically re-
statements of practices which have evolved. Not only does Article 4 parallel
the Bank Collection Code in many respects, but solutions developed through
agreement or banking usage to close the gaps in the previous statute will
continue by virtue of the wide latitude allowed for such nonstatutory ar-
rangements.
It is true that Article 4 will provide a more complete and consistent
statement of the law of bank collections and deposits than has previously
existed. Many of the problems which have heretofore called for learned
discourse and analysis can now be answered by a simple reference to the
statute. But one is tempted to wonder whether, in an area of the law
which has given rise to a scant handful of litigated cases in the last twenty-
five years, these unresolved problems are not largely the "million-to-one"
cases. Barring a return to the era of failing banks the particular provisions
of Article 4 will probably be involved in no greater amount of litigation in
the next twenty-five years. Future concern will be over resolving the prob-
lems arising out of automated check handling. The most significant con-
tribution of Article 4 is likely to be that it provides a timely and sound
basis on which these developments can build.
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